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Abstract— In this paper we review previous works done with 
respect to Conference Key Distribution Systems (CKDS). We 
focus on the system proposed by Kim et al. and we propose 
improvements on that scheme a) from the perspective of security 
and anonymity, b) from the perspective of efficient calculation of 
the Lagrange polynomial coefficients, and c) from the perspective 
of adaptation into the dynamic wireless ad hoc network. The 
security of the proposed scheme is based on the difficulty of 
computing discrete logarithms over elliptic curves, the 
intractability of inverting a one-way hash function and the 
pseudo-randomness of user coordinates. We demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme through the analysis of 
characteristic attack scenarios. 
Keywords—Shared secret; Lagrange interpolation; elliptic curves;  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security and anonymity play vital role for group 
communications in environments such as the Internet, Mobile 
Ad hoc Networks (MANET), Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN) and the new generation networks, like Multi-hop 
Cellular Networks (MCN) and 5G networks (Cloud-RAN). To 
exemplify, in the infrastructure-less wireless ad hoc network 
many group applications, such as content sharing, are protected 
with a symmetric key. Also, in Multi-hop Cellular Networks 
the Base Station and the terminals which are located in 
different cells have to cooperate for the establishment of a 
symmetric encryption key while keeping anonymity.  
In this paper, we focus on a specific category of key 
distribution protocols, namely Conference Key Distribution 
Systems (CKDS) with chairperson. Such CKDS appeared quite 
long before to secure group sessions with the calculation of a 
Conference Key (CK) by a chairperson who distributes the 
security parameters to the session participants. We aim to 
anonymize further the CKDS and exploit it in a more dynamic 
environment, namely the multi-clustered wireless ad hoc 
network. Our aim is to establish a CK in order to secure the 
communications inside each cluster which consists of a number 
simple cluster members and one Cluster Head (CH). However 
in this case we have to take into account that in the highly 
dynamic ad hoc conditions very frequently a new cluster head 
(chairperson) appears and also the cluster members may 
change under the same CH due to mobility, and hence the 
security parameters have to change accordingly. 
A. Motivation  
Our motivation is to review a past series of works done on 
three-stage CKDS and to identify the weaknesses for each 
examined scheme. The elegant work done by Kim et al. [6] 
was a strong incentive for us to optimize the ECDLP-based 
Lagrange polynomial interpolation method utilized in CKDS. 
In addition, we are extending our work of [17] to anonymise 
and optimize further the calculation and distribution of a CK in 
the MANET environment.  
B. Contributions   
• We offer a concise review of the works and the  
comments we encountered in the literature regarding 
CKDS with chairperson, especially those prior and 
including the Kim et al. scheme. We also cite our own 
comments..  
• We improve the Kim et al. scheme from the anonymity 
and security vulnerabilities perspective. Our proposed 
scheme does not require any node identification 
information during the key generation phase as it 
makes use of a polynomial equation system with 
Langrage interpolation and pseudorandom node 
coordinates. Thus we avoid linking attendant identities 
with their private keys. 
• We offer details regarding the calculation of the 
Lagrange polynomial coefficients. 
• We adapt the three-stage CKDS in a way that it is 
suitable for the dynamic wireless ad hoc environment. 
The security of our scheme is based on the 
intractability of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP), the hardness of inverting hash 
functions and the use of ephemeral (rather than long-
term) public keys during the ECDH key agreement 
This work was partially funded by the University of Piraeus. 
  
phase. Moreover, we employ numerical analysis 
methods in order to calculate the necessary security 
parameters.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we examine 
previous works and in section III we cite our comments for the 
Kim et al. scheme. In section IV we cite the proposed scheme 
and in Section V we present a performance analysis summary 
for the two schemes. Section VI examines re-keying issues in 
CKDS and in Section VII we analyze the security of our 
scheme. Finally, section VIII concludes and states the future 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The CKDS concept with chairperson was introduced in [1]. 
In [2] T.C Wu proposed a CKDS with user anonymity based 
on algebraic approach with the use of one-way hash functions 
to hide the identities of the attendants. In [3] the three-stage 
Tseng-Jan scheme proposed user anonymity with two 
improvements on Wu’s CKDS, however being based on the 
same cryptographic assumptions. The first improvement 
proposed a CKDS with simple polynomial interpolation and 
the use of hash function to hide the participants identities and 
random selection of the conference key (CK) by the 
chairperson. The second proposal did not use a one-way 
function. In [4] the Yang, Chang and Hwang scheme proposed 
user anonymity based on the intractability of the ECDLP. In 
their three-stage scheme the conference key is randomly 
chosen by the chairperson who then broadcasts to the 
attendants the values y" that belong to a linear curve.  
In [5] the Lin et al. commented the Yang et al. scheme [4] 
and described an “intruder” attack in which a non-legitimate 
user (i.e., someone who does not share a secret with the 
chairperson) could, according to the authors claims, uniquely 
solve a set of linear equations to acquire the h" of the legitimate 
participants and also to recover CK. To overcome that attack of 
solving equations simultaneously, Lin et al. proposed a small-
cost modification of the Yang et al. scheme in which the 
transmitted values y" are substituted by y"′ = 	 h"⨁y".  
Kim et al. [6] reviewed the Yang et al. scheme [4] and the 
Lin et al. scheme [5]. They identified a weakness common in 
both schemes, namely that a legitimate attendant to distinguish 
his own value y" , without receiving any useful information 
from the chairperson, should check all y" values to recover CK 
and verify its validity which incurs unnecessary computational 
cost. To overcome, and in better support of user anonymity, 
Kim et al. proposed a three-stage CKDS scheme which for the 
made use of the Lagrange polynomial interpolation method. In 
the Kim et al. scheme [6] the chair-person calculates the CK 
which has to be recovered by the legitimate attendants by 
means of the Lagrange coefficients which are broadcasted in a 
broadcast message M.  
In [7] Tang and Mitchell, almost concurrently with Kim et 
al., commented the Yang et al. [4] and the Lin et al. [5] 
schemes. They correctly stated that Lin et al., in their intruder 
attack definition against the Yang et al. scheme, failed to 
observe that the system of equations the “intruder” attacker has 
to solve to obtain the hashes hi and CK is actually n x (n+1) 
and not n x n and therefore their solution is not unique. In 
addition, in their comments on the Yang et al. scheme Tang 
and Mitchell identified a different vulnerability. Namely, they 
identified one attack in which a legitimate attendant, i.e., 
someone who shares a secret with the chairperson, after 
recovering CK, can solve n x n system of equations to obtain 
all hi values of the rest legitimate attendants. In sequence, the 
attacker pretending the chairperson can forge a new message M 
sending modified values y(′ = c* h( + CK
.	thus including a 
new, valid but forged conference key. To our view this is a 
correct vulnerability identification regarding the Yang et al. 
scheme and in the rest of this paper we will call this type of 
attack the intruder attack. The second weakness identified by 
Q. Tang and C. J. Mitchell [7] is the same with that spotted by 
Kim et al, namely that there is no real anonymity supported in 
[4] and [5] since a legitimate attendant has to determine his 
own value y", or �0′, of all values received in order to solve for 
the CK.  
A summary of the comments we found in the literature 
regarding Yang et al., Lin et al. ([4] and [5]) schemes follows:  
• Both schemes do not really maintain the user 
anonymity since the values y"  or y"
.	distributed to the 
attendants are directly linked to their identity.  
• Trying to keep anonymity in Yang et al. and Lin et al. 
schemes would lead to unnecessary computation costs 
for key recovery and key verification by all the 
attending users, as underlined by Kim et al in [6]. 
• Both schemes are vulnerable to the intruder attack in 
which an attendant attacker can obtain hi values of the 
rest legitimate participants and hence can forge new 
CK to mislead them.  
Our additional comment regarding schemes [4] and [5] is 
the following: 
Yang et al. and Lin et al. assume that the private keys 
x" are randomly assigned by the system to the nodes 
and delivered to them through a secure channel, which 
is unsafe because increases the chances to solve the 
ECDLP. On the contrary, we propose private keys 
generated on demand by an assymetric cryptosystem. 
The private keys are kept inside each of the attendant 
nodes. The limitation in this case is the computational 
cost to generate those keys.  
Finally, our work in [17] incorporated the polynomial 
interpolation approach into ad hoc cluster head selection 
procedure implemented with voting among the members. 
  
III. A SECOND SERIES OF WORKS AND COMMENTS THAT WE 
FOUND IN THE LITERATURE RELATES TO A DIFFERENT 
CATEGORY OF PROTOCOLS, NAMELY FOUR-STAGE KEY 
AGREEMENT PROTOCOLS WHICH INCLUDE ONE ADDITIONAL 
FAULT-DETECTION STAGE FOR INTRUDER IDENTIFICATION AND 
EXCLUSION. INDICATIVELY WE CITE HERE SOME RELATIVE 
WORKS DONE IN [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] AND [13]. IN [10] WE 
ENCOUNTERED THE ALREADY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESS OF 
HAVING TO LINK THE IDENTITY OF PARTICIPANTS WITH THE 
BROADCASTED SHARES DI. THIS CATEGORY OF KEY 
AGREEMENT PROTOCOLS IS OUT OF THE CURRENT PAPER’S 
SCOPE AND THEREFORE WILL BE STUDIED THOROUGHLY IN OUR 
FUTURE WORK. COMMENTS ON THE KIM ET AL. SCHEME 
1) Initiative stage 
Kim et al. assume a system that coincides with a static 
chairperson who assigns to each session attendant his random 
private key x" and chairperson’s public key Qc through a secret 
channel. On the contrary, we propose that the private-public 
key pairs must be generated on demand by the attendants 
during the key distribution stage (not during the initiative 
stage) as also on demand must be generated the session keys 
k"3 shared between an attendant and the chairperson. Another 
solution would be to pre-load the public keys of all users 
during the initiative stage. However it would dramatically 
increase the storage requirements for each user. Besides, pre-
loaded public keys are long-term keys lacking the ephemeral 
characteristic of short-term keys that we seek in the dynamic 
infrastructure-less wireless ad hoc network. 
2) Key distribution stage 
a) In the Kim et al. scheme the chairperson �5 generates 
the coordinate pair {ℎ฀0 , �(ℎ฀0)}	for each participant. The 
pair-wise session key �05 	 is protected inside the hash 
value 	ℎ0 = �(�50 	||	��5 	||	��0 	||	�		)	||	� . Therefore, in the 
calculation of hash values ℎ0  (Step2 and Step3 in their key 
distribution stage) Kim et al. expose the participant identity 
IDi which contradicts to privacy. We claim that the user 
identities can be used a priori if an authenticated ECDH 
protocol is adopted to establish the pair-wise session keys, so 
that there is no need to re-use them when calculating the hash 
values. In our scheme the hash value is calculated by omitting 
the participant identity, ℎ฀0 = �(�50 	||	�5 	||	�		)	||	�  so that 
no opportunity is given to conspiracy and identity attackers to 
link identities with keys (see section VII). 
b)  Kim et al. do not provide any forward secrecy 
guarantees. On the contrary, we propose that the pair-wise 
session keys �05 	are established by forcing each participant 
and �5  to generate and exchange short-time public keys 
according to the ECDH protocol during the key distribution 
stage. Afterwards, the short-time EC-paired keys have to be 
deleted. In addition, we recommend adopting authenticated 
DH protocol in the establishment of session keys to guarantee 
forward-secrecy in CKDS. 
c)  In Step 3 the chairperson applies Lagrange 
polynomial interpolation to construct a polynomial of degree 
n-1 and calculates its n coefficients (�EF*, … , �H)  where 
CK=�H  assuming that n is the number of the participants. 
However, Kim et al. do not specify the way in which the 
Lagrange coefficients are calculated. We provide details for 
efficient calculation of the Lagrange polynomial coefficients 
utilizing Newton’s symmetrical functions.  
d)  Kim et al. scheme uses the polynomial interpolation 
approach. In the case that � is small (i.e., in realistic scenarios 
for example five attending nodes) then the Lagrange 
polynomial would have a very small	� − 1	������ and could 
be analyzed by attacker. In addition, with a poorly designed 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) it could be easily solved 
by an attacker. Clearly, this is another trade-off: the larger the 
polynomial degree, the more the necessary calculations that 
have to be performed by legitimate users, however the scheme 
becomes more secure. 
e)  In the Kim et al. scheme neither an intruder nor a non-
attending attacker can obtain the pairs 	{฀0 , �(฀0)}  of the 
legitimate attendants simply because 	฀0 	are not distributed 
by the chairperson. Moreover, for intruder who has recovered 
CK, to find another attendant’s private key it is hard because 
has to solve the ECDLP. However, if this is achieved, then 
intruder will have found 	�05  and then by brute force attack 
against one-way function could find the corresponding 
attendant identity. In this way he could totally break the 
anonymity of the system (knowledge of who of the attendants 
owns a specific private key and, moreover, who owns a 
specific session key).  
3) Key recovery stage 
Same procedure with that described in the Kim et al. scheme. 
IV. PROPOSED CKDS SCHEME 
A. System assumptions  
We change the assumptions made in the Kim et al. scheme; 
we make necessary adaptations for the wireless ad hoc 
network. In more detail: 
• The security of the communications medium is that of 
an authenticated broadcast channel. We assume digital 
signatures so that an unauthorized external attacker 
cannot learn the key and decrypt the exchanged 
messages during a session. 
• The system can be mainly attacked by malicious 
internal users (intruders) who launch active attacks 
such as conspiracy, forge of CK pretending the 
chairperson (impersonation), and anonymity breaking 
attack (see section VII).  
• In our adaptation  of CKDS for the homogeneous 
wireless ad hoc environment we assume that the 
network is structured in dynamic clusters, each 
consisting of member nodes and a Cluster Head who 
calculates the Conference Key and broadcasts the 
necessary parameters for the cluster members to 
recover the key. . In the case that the CH changes, the 
CKDS procedure has to be restarted.  
B. Implementation details 
We follow the nomenclature of a (t, n) -threshold secret-
sharing scheme (TSS = (PG, DS, SC)) which consists of three 
  
stages: the public parameter generation (PPG), the dealer setup 
(DS) and the share combiner (SC) to distribute a shared secret 
CK. Let A = U*, UT, … , UU " denote the set of all m nodes in 
the network and let B = U*, UT, … , UW " denote the set of all 
legitimate participants in the session (n < �). 
The PPG stage takes as input a security parameter pair k ∈ K 
(here K denotes the secret set	{0,1}[) and returns a string y ∈ Y 
of public parameters (here Y denotes the public set {0,1}]). 
The DS stage takes as input a security/public parameter pair 
(k, y) and a secret s from the secret space S k, x 	Í	{0,1}`a* 
and returns a list of n shares s = s*, … , sW ,	 where s" is the ith 
share space S k, x  for i = 1, … , n. 
The SC stage takes as input a security/public parameter pair 
(k, y) and any subset sc = s" ∶ i ∈ I  of t out of the n shares, 
and returns a recovered secret s ∈ S k, x 	 (here I  denotes a 
subset of [n]  of size #I = t ). The correctness and security 
parameters properties of a (t, n -threshold secret-sharing 
scheme can be quantified by the definitions of those in [14].   
Public Parameter Generation (PPG) 
 We assume that the �� public domain parameters (elliptic 
curve E  defined over a finite field �m with base point G  of 
prime order p) are already known to the ad hoc network. 
Initially, a chairperson (CH), to start the session, broadcasts 
initiation message to make known his own public key Q3 to 
the participants	U" ∈ B.   
Dealer Setup (DS) 
 Each attendant after receiving the EC domain parameters 
and Q3 secretly generates pseudo-random integer coordinates, 
x", y" ∈ 1, p − 1  that define a point Z".	Then each attendant 
generates hisephemeral public key Q" = x"G  on the Elliptic 
Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) and then signs and unicasts this 
ephemeral public key to the initiating node Us.	 
After receiving and authenticating all Q", U3 computes the 
ECDH pair-wise keys k3" = Z3Q" shared with each U".	This is 
different than [6] in which all Q" are created and kept inside 
�ℎ�	������	(U3) . Then the chairman computes the hash 
values h" = H(k3"	||	Z3	||	T		)	||	m and constructs a polynomial 
with degree n − 1  using �  coordinate points {h", H(h")}  by 
applying Langrage polynomial interpolation, similar to [6] and 
[14].  
� � = �(ℎz)�z � 	���	�
E
z~*
 
where,	�z � =
()F

,
F

,
= �EF*�
EF* +
�EFT�
EFT +⋯+ �*� + �H	���	�                        (1) 
 
CH, C*,, … , CWF* ∈ Z	
∗ .	 
The secret that will be shared amongst all the legitimate 
attendants is the constant value in (1), CK = CH.   
Lagrange polynomial coefficients calculation: We describe 
now in detail the method we recommend in order the 
chairperson to calculate the n  Lagrange polynomial 
coefficients C"  of (1) during the DS phase. In (1) each basis 
polynomial �z(Z) is of degree n − 1	degree and in canonical 
form can be written as: 
 L` Z =
()F

,
F

,
= cWF*Z
WF* + cWFTZ
WFT +⋯+ c*Z +
cH	mod	p .                                                  (2) 
 
It can be easily seen from (2) that: 
 
�z � =
1, � = 	ℎz
0, � ≠ ℎz
                                                      (3) 
 
Therefore, each polynomial �z (Z) has exactly n − 1 roots at 
the previously computed hash values ℎ , � ≠ �, � = 1, … , �,	 
namely, h*, hT,, … , h`F*, h`a*, … , hW and hence the coefficients 
c"  in (2) can be easily calculated by applying Newton’s 
symmetrical functions according to (4): 
cWF* = 1,	 
cWFT 	= −(1 + hT +	h	+⋯ , hWF*), 
				cWF 	= h*hT + h*h+,… , h*hWF*
+	hTh	+	hTh	+, … , +	hThWF* 
							+⋯+	hWFThWF*,	 
                              …, 
cH = 	 (−1)
WF*(h*hTh…hWF*).	                                      (4) 
 
It can be seen that the Lagrange coefficients C" in (1) can be 
derived from the coefficients c"	as follows: 
�0 = 	 �z0
E
z~* �(ℎz) 	mod	p, � = 0 1 � − 1.(5)  
 
Therefore, having derived c"  for each �z (Z) from (4), the 
chairperson by applying (5) can calculate the Lagrange 
polynomial coefficients. For example, in the case that the 
number of session participants is six, the six coefficients of 
each fifth-degree polynomial �z (Z), � = 1 1 6	 can be 
calculated by applying (4). Then the Lagrange polynomial 
coefficients C" can be derived applying (5). 
Next, U3 computes the check value of the shared secret and 
adds the timestamp T	 as V = H(CK	||	Z3	||	T		)  before U3 
broadcasts the message including all C" except from CH. 
M = (Z3, V, T, CWF*, C, … , C*)                     (6) 
 
Note: In order to increase the security of our system and 
prevent attacker from solving a small-degree Lagrange 
polynomial (sessions with small membership case) we 
recommend that U3  generates additional pseudo-random 
coordinate pairs {h", H(h")} to increase the polynomial degree. 
However the number of the artificial curve points should be 
adjustable to the capacity of the nodes since the interpolation 
computational cost increases O(n
2
) with the polynomial degree 
n or, equivalently, with the number of non-zero coefficients 
that have to be calculated from (4) and (5). 
Share Combiner (SC) 
  
In this phase, each participant  	U"  in the conference 
receives the message M  and performs the share combiner 
recovery procedure, where only legitimate U" ∈ B (i.e., those 
users that have already established a pair-wise key with 
U3)	can recover the correct CK after Step1 to Step4.   
Step1. First, U"  verifies the expiration of the received 
timestamp, T  and if it is invalid, U"  terminates the recovery 
process.   
Step2. Second, U" computes the ECDH pair-wise key with 
U3, as k3" = Z"Q3.  
Step3. Third, U"  computes h" = H(k3"	||	Z3	||	T		)	||	m  and 
solves CK from the following equality: 
H h" = cWF* h"
WF* + cWFT h"
WFT +⋯+ c*x + cH	mod	p
 0¡¢£¤
	CK = cH = H h" − cWF* h"
WF* − cWFT h"
WFT −⋯−
c*x		mod	p                                                                             (7) 
 
Step4. Finally, U" checks the validity of CK by verifying  
H CK	||	Z3	||	T		 = V.           (8) 
 
We construct our polynomial without using identities of 
attendants and we recover the shared secret CK by using 
polynomial equation system in SC phase. Therefore, our 
scheme does not require any user identification information or 
unecessary computation costs for the attending members. The 
attending members are not allowed to encrypt messages with 
the session key k3"  but only with the CK to avoid chosen 
plaintext attacks. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The three tables that follow show the computation, 
communication and storage cost of the two examined schemes 
per node in a group of n in total nodes (with chairperson). 
Polynomial computations are done in Zp
*
 The main advantages 
of our proposal is significant storage space saving and 
computational offload for the chairperson, dynamicity, which 
is essential for wireless ad hoc networks (see Tables I and III), 
smaller broadcast message size and no assumption of 
assigning the computational overhead to the system or 
delivering keys through private channels..  
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF OPERATIONS PER NODE – PPG PHASE  
PPG Operations 
Ui Uc 
Kim Our Kim Our 
Comp. Random integer 
generation 
  
n for	all	{x"} 
 
2	for	Zs 
EC scalar-point 
multiplications     
n  
for all {Qi} 
 
1 for Q3 
Modular integer 
multiplications  
    
Hashes     
Comm. Authenticated 
Broadcasts  
  
1 with Q3 
(and	all	{x"}) 
1 with Q3 
Unicasts    - - 
Storage Message size 
xi + QC QC 
n 
for all  {Qi } 
QC 
TABLE II.  NUMBER OF OPERATIONSPER NODE – DS PHASE 
DS Operations/node 
Ui Uc 
Kim Our Kim Our 
Comp. Random integer 
generation 
- 2	for	(Z")   
EC scalar-point 
multiplications   
- 1	for		Q" 
n  
for all 
{kci}  
 
n  
for 
all{kci} 
 
Modular integ. 
multiplications  
  
Un-
specified 
n
2
 
Hashes   2n+1 2n+1 
Comm. Broadcasts    1(M) 1(M) 
Unicasts  
 
1 with 
Qi 
- - 
Storage Message size 
xi + QC 
Zi + Qc 
+ Qi  
n 
for all   
{Qi } 
QC +  
all {Qi} 
TABLE III.  NUMBER OF OPERATIONS – SC PHASE 
SC Operations/node 
Ui Uc 
Kim  Own Kim  Own 
Computations Random integer 
generation 
  
EC scalar-point 
multiplications 
1 for	k"3  
Modular integer 
multiplications 
Un-
specified 
n-1 
(Horner) 
 
Hashes 3  
Storage 
Message size xi + QC 
Zi + Q3  
Qi  deleted 
n 
{Qi} 
Q3 
VI. RE-KEYING AND CKDS 
The use of ECC is attractive in the case of low-resource 
networks (e.g., in WSN). Consequently, ECC-based CKDS 
can also be attractive in generating and distributing a shared 
symmetric key among the nodes of wireless ad hoc clusters. 
However, if an ECC-based CKDS scheme is to be utilized into 
those highly dynamic networks, attention should be paid on 
efficient re-keying.  
Kim et al. do not consider dynamic sessions. Their 
procedure has to be restarted whenever a new participant is 
added in a session. On the contrary, in the wireless ad hoc 
environment we have to consider that mobile nodes join and 
leave the clusters quite frequently under the same CH. We 
reduce the computational cost to calculate a new shared 
conference key from the previously calculated key parameters 
by proposing two methods.  
a) First, by utilizing numerical analysis methods. We 
propose that if a new node joins (leaves) an ad hoc cluster, 
provided that its pair of coordinates {ℎ0 , �(ℎ0)} is known to 
the cluster head, then the latter can calculate a new �H
.   from 
�H  by applying recursively Newton’s divided difference 
polynomial formula [16]. For a single join the new Lagrange 
interpolation polynomial (1) will be of degree n and a new CK 
can be recursively derived from the previous polynomial of n-
1 degree.  
b) Secondly, by exploiting the inherent characteristics of 
the wireless ad hoc network. To reduce the expensive re-
keying calculations, we recommend to utilize the periodic 
  
hello messages which the ad hoc nodes (e.g., sensors) 
broadcast for building their two-hop Neighboring Lists [15]. 
The cluster head can utilize the Neighboring Lists to predict 
which are the distant mobile nodes that have the largest 
probability to join the cluster. Then he can construct the 
corresponding additional points {ℎ0 , �(ℎ0)} increasing so the 
degree of the Lagrange interpolation polynomial. In this way, 
the CKDS becomes more secure (as usually not without 
computational cost), and when new nodes will join the cluster, 
there will be no need to restart key establishment since the 
new Lagrange polynomial coefficients will have been derived 
a priori due to inclusion of the predicted points in the 
claculation for the CK.  
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
We proposed a CKDS scheme that follows well-defined 
cryptographic assumptions: the intractability of computing the 
ECDLP, the hardness of inverting a one-way function and the 
pseudo-randomness of the coordinates.  If these assumptions 
can be solved easily, then CKDS cannot provide user 
anonymity and data privacy.  
In addition, we made adaptations for the dynamic and 
structured wireless ad hoc network assuming that the legitimate 
ad hoc nodes have the necessary capacity to generate a public-
private key pair using an ECC. Considering that, each node 
U" ∈ B belonging to a cluster dynamically generates an elliptic 
curve key pair, whose secret key Z" ∈ [1, p − 1]  i.e., x", y" ∈
[1, p − 1] is secured inside the node and the public key Q" is 
unicasted to the cluster head node who may be changing.  This 
section presents several basic attack scenarios to demonstrate 
how the security is enhanced by the proposed CKDS scheme in 
comparison to the previous mentioned schemes.  
Attack scenario 1 (conspiracy attack): Assume that an 
intruder attacker who has recovered CK tries to find the 
session keys of other legitimate attendants. Knowledge of point 
Z" of another attendant would allow to compute his session key 
k3".  However, in order to find the pseudo-random coordinates 
of point Z", the attacker needs either to solve ECDLP or  brute 
force the [1, p-1] space. In addition, if wanted to reveal k3" 
attacker should have to launch brute force attack to guess 
k3"	 from (unknown) h"  that in addition must belong to the 
polynomial curve. The same applies when more than one 
cluster nodes collaborate to reveal the session key of other 
attendants (ad hoc cluster members). That is more secure than 
the Yang et al. scheme in which the participant attackers can 
obtain h"	and try launching brute force attack against the one-
way function to obtain k3"  and  ID" . Regarding Tseng-Jan 
scheme, Yang et al. have already shown that it is vulnerable to 
conspiracy attack.   
Attack scenario 2 (eavesdropper): Assume an external 
attacker who tries to reveal the common share secret CK after 
capturing the message M broadcasted in DS phase.  The 
attacker should first have to compute the hash value h" =
H(k3"	||	Z3	||	T		)	||	m and then try to recover the CK based on 
the knowledge of the coefficients included in message M.  
However, external user has not the ability to generate h" , 
because the difficulty involved in generating the coordinates Z" 
is based on the ECDLP as is the hardness of computing ECDH 
key k3".  
Attack scenario 3 (breaking anonymity of session members): 
Assume attendant (cluster member) U( ∈ B  tries to find the 
identity of another session attendant. U" ∈ B  can easily 
reconstruct the share secret CK.  However, it is infeasible to 
find the identity of another neighboring node since the node 
identities are not included at any stage of the proposed scheme.  
In previous CKDS schemes the identity can be revealed with 
brute force attack in the one-way function H(	). 
Attack scenario 4 (impersonation attack-pretending the 
chairperson):  
An intruder tries to replay an intercepted message M =
(Z3, V, T, CWF*, CWFT, … , C*) to impersonate the cluster head U3 
and compromise the ad hoc network operation.  The attacker 
should set a new acceptable timestamp T so that the cluster 
nodes can verify the validity of T in DS phase. Then, the 
cluster nodes compute k3" and h" to solve the CK and ckeck the 
validity of CK by verifying H CK	||	Z3	||	T		 = V.  However, 
the attacker can not forge a valid CK without knowing Z3 from 
Q3. To obtain Z3 from Q3 is equivalent to solving the ECDLP. 
The cluster nodes can verify the validity of V at SC recovery 
stage. Therefore, an attacker cannot obtain any secret by 
replaying an intercepted message M. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We reviewed previous CKDS schemes and we adapted the 
Lagrange polynomial interpolation method combined with 
elliptic curve cryptographic techniques in distributing secret 
shares in the restricted ad hoc network. We analyzed our 
scheme with attack scenarios which prove that it overcomes the 
vulnerabilities of the previously proposed schemes. In the 
future we are planning to evaluate and optimize the 
effectiveness and efficiency of our proposal through network 
simulation and comparisons with other CKDS schemes.   
REFERENCES 
[1] I. Ingemarsson, D.T. Tang, and C.K. Wong, “A conference key 
distribution system”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-28, 
1982, pp. 714–720. 
[2] T.C. Wu, “Conference key distribution system with user anonymity 
based on algebraic approach”, IEE Proceedings. Computer Digital 
Technology 144 (2), 1997, pp. 145–148. 
[3] Y.M. Tseng, J.K. Jan, “Anonymous conference key distribution systems 
based on discrete logarithm problem”, Computer Communications 22 
(1999) pp. 749–754. 
[4] C.C. Yang, T.Y. Chang, M.S. Hwang, “A new anonymous conference 
key distribution system based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem”, Computer Standards and Interfaces, 25 (2003) pp: 141-145. 
[5] C.H. Lin, C.Y. Lee, W. Lee, “Comments on the Yang-Chang- Hwang 
anonymous conference key distribution system”, Computer Standards 
and Interfaces, 26 (2004) pp: 171–174. 
[6] W.H. Kim, E.K. Ryu, J.Y. Im, K.Y. Yoo, “New conference key 
agreement protocol with user anonymity”, Computer Standards & 
Interfaces, 27 (2005); 185–190. 
[7] Q. Tang and C. J. Mitchell, “Comments on two anonymous conference 
key distribution schemes”, Computer Standards & Interfaces, 27 (2005); 
397-400. 
[8] W.G. Tzeng, Z.J. Tzeng, “Round-efficient conference key agreement 
protocols with provable security”, Advances in Cryptology, 
ASIACRYPT 2000, Volume 1976 of the series Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 614-627. 
  
[9] W.G. Tzeng, “A secure fault-tolerant conference key agreement 
protocol”, IEEE Transactions on Computers 51 (4) (2002) 373–379. 
[10] K.H. Huang, Y.F. Chung, H. H Lee, F. Lai, T.S. Chen, “A conference 
key agreement protocol with fault tolerant capability”, Computer 
Standards & Interfaces; 31 (2009); 401-405;  
[11] W.G. Tzeng, “A Practical and Secure Fault-Tolerant Conference-Key 
Agreement Protocol”, Public Key Cryptography, Volume 1751 of the 
series Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1-13. 
[12] Y.M. Tseng, “A communication-efficient and fault-tolerant conference-
key agreement protocol with forward secrecy”, Journal of Systems and 
Software, Volume 80, Issue 7, July 2007, pp. 1091–1101. 
[13] Y.M. Tseng “An Improved Conference-Key Agreement Protocol with 
Forward Secrecy”, Informatica 16(2), 275-284 (2005). 
[14] N. Komninos, C. Douligeris, “LIDF: Layered intrusion detection 
framework for ad-hoc networks”, Journal of Ad Hoc Networks, Volume 
7, Issue 1, January 2009, pp. 171-182. 
[15] C. Tselikis, S. Mitrpoulos, C. Douligeris, Ν. Komninos, “Degree-based 
Clustering Algorithms for Wireless ad hoc Networks under Attack", 
IEEE Communications Letters, Volume 16, Number 5, 2012, pp. 619-
621. 
[16] R. L. Burden, J. D. Faires, A. Burden, Numerical Analysis, 10
th
 Edition, 
ISBN-10: 1305253663. 
[17] Ν. Komninos, C. Tselikis, C. Douligeris, “SAnoVS: Secure Anonymous 
Voting Scheme for Clustered ad hoc Networks”, 8th IEEE Symposium 
on Computers and Communication (ISCC’13), 07 July 2013, Croatia, 
pp: 192-196. 
